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NOTES
PRESERVING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS FOR LEGAL
IMMIGRANTS RECEIVING FOOD STAMPS IN
LIGHT OF THE PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996
Todd G. Cosenza
INTRODUCTION
Socorro Cruz is a single mother who works on the assembly line of a
California plastics factory and barely earns the minimum wage.' As a
legal immigrant2 from Mexico, she hoped to receive food stamps to
support her eight-year-old son and herself.3 However, once the provi-
sions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcili-
ation Act of 1996' (the "Personal Responsibility Act") are
implemented in California, food stamp benefits will be eliminated for
almost all legal immigrants,5 including Socorro Cruz.6
The Personal Responsibility Act eliminates food stamp benefits for
all legal immigrants except certain qualified aliens.7 Included in this
exception are those immigrants who have met a "forty qualifying
quarters" work test.8 Moreover, minor children and spouses of legal
immigrants attempting to meet this exception can receive credit for
qualifying quarters earned by their supporters.9 Merely working for
forty quarters, or ten years, however, is not necessarily enough to
qualify for this exception. A legal immigrant must meet certain levels
of quarterly earnings to qualify.'" As of August 22, 1997, all legal im-
migrants not qualifying under the forty qualifying quarter exception
will lose their food stamps due to their immigrant status." For these
1. Patrick J. McDonnell, Fear and Uncertainty as Federal Welfare Rules Begin,
Legal Immigrants Brace for the Worst, L.A. Tunes, Oct. 3, 1996, at B1.
2. Legal immigrants for purposes of this Note are those who are here lawfully,
having entered legally, and are note in violation of the terms of their temporary occu-
pancy in the United States. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and
the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1453, 1458 (1995). They are "known as perma-
nent residents and green card holders." Joyce C. Vialet & Larry M. Eig, Alien Eligibil-
ity for Benefits Under the New Welfare and Immigration Laws, CRS Rep. for
Congress, Oct. 16, 1996, at 3 (on file with the Fordham Law Review). See infra note
72 for the definition of a legal immigrant under the Personal Responsibility Act.
3. McDonnell, supra note 1, at B1.
4. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
5. § 401, 110 Stat. at 2261-62.
6. McDonnell, supra note 1, at B1.
7. § 402, 110 Stat. at 2262-63.
8. A qualifying quarter is a quarter year work period that is credited toward So-
cial Security. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
9. § 435, 110 Stat. at 2275-76.
10. See infra note 102 for levels of earnings needed to qualify.
11. § 401, 110 Stat. at 2261-62.
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individuals, the consequences will be severe; as Socorro Cruz stated,
"[t]he little bit extra would have helped a lot."12
Socorro Cruz epitomizes the plight of many immigrants who are
attempting to qualify under this exception. Although Cruz has been
employed for the last twenty-one years, and theoretically has met the
forty quarters exception, much of her salary was paid "off the
books."' 3 Many legal immigrants who come to the United States in
desperate need of employment opportunities often accept cash paying
jobs. 4 Because federal taxes were not withheld from their employ-
ment payments, many legal immigrants, like Socorro Cruz, will have
difficulty proving their eligibility for the food stamp benefit
exception. 5
Although the Personal Responsibility Act mandates the elimination
of food stamp benefits to legal immigrants, the process of taking the
half-million immigrants already receiving food stamps off the rolls has
caused delays, confusion, and turmoil within the welfare bureau-
cracy.' 6 Perhaps in its haste to pass the measure, or in an attempt to
obscure the bill's harsh realities, Congress has drafted a statute filled
with contradictory provisions.1 7 As predicted by one Senator who op-
12. McDonnell, supra note 1, at Bi.
13. I at B6. The term "off the books" refers to payment in cash for services
rendered without the employee or employer reporting the income to the government.
See United States v. Morris, 99 F.3d 476, 483 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the defend-
ants were involved in a tax conspiracy in which cash payments were made off the
books); Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, 974 F.2d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 1992)(finding that immigrant non-union workers were paid off the books with no taxes
withheld in violation of wage laws).
14. See William Branigin, Reaping Abuse for What They Sew; Sweatshops Once
Again Commonplace in U.S. Garment Industry, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1997, at Al, A30(stating that the garment industry takes advantage of immigrant workers' need for
employment and pays these workers low wages off the books); Patrick J. McDonnell,
Legal Advocacy Groups Sue over Food Stamp Changes, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1996, at
A3, A23 (claiming that most immigrants will have difficulty proving that they meet
the forty qualifying quarter exception because legal immigrants often are forced to
take cash-paying jobs). Employment "off the books" is considered covered employ-
ment for the purpose of social security benefits. See infra note 178 for a definition of
covered employment.
15. McDonnell, supra note 1, at B6.
16. See, e.g., Ken Chavez & Brad Hayward, Welfare Rules Confuse Many, Sacra-
mento Bee, Sept. 21, 1996, at Al, A20 (stating that the United States Department of
Agriculture and state officials have had difficulty understanding the Personal Respon-
sibility Act's provisions dealing with certification of legal immigrants); see also
Jonathan Alter, Washington Washes Its Hands, Newsweek, Aug. 12, 1996, at 42, 43(stating that "the nation is embarking on a vast domestic social experiment" and that
the "new law is not conservative, it's radical"); William Claiborne, At a California
Clinic, Outbreak of Uncertainty, Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1996, at A4 (describing the con-
fusing consequences for legal immigrants under the Personal Responsibility Act).
17. See Judith Havemann & William Claiborne, Confusion over Food-Stamp Cut-
off: States Unsure Which Immigrants Must Be Denied Aid Under New Law, Seattle
Tmes, Sept. 24, 1996, at A3 (reporting that under the new law, states have been con-
fused over who still qualifies for food stamps); Ralph Jimenez, A New Day for Welfare
Providers, Recipients, Boston Globe, Nov. 17, 1996, at NH1 (stating that the language
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posed the bill, "[t]he poor, the elderly, the disabled will simply lack
the means to care for themselves, and, what is worse, they have no
grace period to prepare for these changes."'" While Congress has the
right to enact legislation that some may consider unfair,19 it can never
encroach on the procedural due process guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.23
This Note argues that all provisions of the Personal Responsibility
Act, especially those relating to food stamps, must provide legal immi-
grants with necessary procedural due process safeguards. Legal immi-
grants who either: 1) have worked forty qualifying quarters; 2) have
been or are a spouse of an individual who worked forty qualifying
quarters; or 3) have been or are a child under the age of eighteen of
an individual who worked forty qualifying quarters meet the statutory
exception that allows them to continue receiving food stamps. Be-
cause of the procedural complexity involved in determining whether
or not a legal immigrant has met this exception, however, many de-
serving legal immigrants are in danger of losing their food stamp ben-
efits. Understandable and practical procedural safeguards, including
the right to a full pre-termination evidentiary hearing, are necessary to
ensure that those who have worked forty quarters continue to receive
food stamp benefits.
Part I of this Note examines the history of procedural due process
from its constitutional foundations through the current case law. The
evolution of the Court's interpretation of procedural due process
reveals the confusion engendered by this constitutional guarantee.
of the Personal Responsibility Act "is akin to using a road map printed in a foreign
language while driving at high speed through traffic").
18. 142 Cong. Rec. S11,868 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
19. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915).
In Bi-Metallic, the Court assumed that the power of democracy protects individuals'
rights from the actions of lawmaking representatives. Id. Additionally, the Court
viewed statutory enactments as raising policy questions that are best suited for the
legislature, while adjudicative processes are better suited for individual how, why, and
where questions. See id.; see also Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.02,
at 115-16 (1959) (articulating the distinctions between legislative and adjudicative
facts); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Cal. L Rev.
1044, 1117-18 (1984) (discussing the distinction between rule-making and adjudication
that has been used in modem administrative law). Yet, these considerable assump-
tions made by the Court in Bi-Metallic would be difficult to apply to legal immigrants.
Today's Court would have to consider whether the procedural processes offered by
the political system fairly protect the interests of legal immigrants who are food stamp
recipients. See infra note 211 for a discussion of the obstacles that prevent legal im-
migrants from participating in the political process. See generally Richard E. Levy,
Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights,
73 N.C. L. Rev. 329, 396-97 (1995) (stating that the importance of liberal social policy
would allow the Court to be more aggressive in protecting substantive rights); Ste-
phen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. Pa. L Rev. 1277,
1278 (1993) (arguing for enhanced judicial protection for the poor).
20. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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Part I will show that from its greatest day in Goldberg v. Kelly"' to its
more limited strength today, the use of procedural due process guar-
antees has varied over time. Because legal immigrants have enjoyed
procedural due process guarantees,2 courts easily could apply this
doctrine to the food stamp provisions pertaining to legal immigrants
in the Personal Responsibility Act.
Part II examines the statutory language of the provisions in the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act that affects legal immigrants' receipt of food
stamp benefits. This part analyzes the Personal Responsibility Act's
language relating to the denial of food stamp benefits to all legal im-
migrants and explains the forty qualifying quarters exception in detail.
Part III examines the procedures that the government is using to
implement the elimination of legal immigrants' food stamp benefits.
In particular, part III focuses on the food stamp recertification process
and the procedures used to determine if the legal immigrants meet the
forty qualifying quarters exception.
Part IV applies procedural due process analysis to the Personal Re-
sponsibility Act's forty qualifying quarters exception and the guide-
lines that have been specified to implement the Personal
Responsibility Act's elimination of food stamp benefits from legal im-
migrants. Finally, it concludes that before The Personal Responsibil-
ity Act's provisions can affect the food stamp benefits of a legal
immigrant attempting to meet the forty qualifying quarters exception,
a state must apply the full constitutional procedural due process safe-
guards imposed in court proceedings, including the right to call wit-
nesses, the right to counsel, and the right to cross examine.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
While the right to procedural due process is explicitly provided in
the Constitution,2 3 initially, the Court was hesitant to give this right
any significant meaning. The Court changed its interpretation in the
early 1970s, however, tremendously expanding the scope of interests
protected by procedural due process and the procedures necessary to
safeguard those interests. Over the last two decades, the Court has
retreated and reduced the breadth of procedural due process safe-
21. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). The Court interpreted
the term "person" used in the Due Process Clauses to include lawfully admitted aliens
as well as citizens of the United States. The statutes in question in Graham created
two classes of needy persons that were similar in every respect except for their status
as citizens. Id. at 367-68. As a result, United States citizens were allowed to file for
and continue to receive benefits while legal immigrants, upon application, were de-
nied these same benefits and could not continue to obtain governmental assistance.
The Court held that procedural due process demands that everyone have the same
opportunity to life, liberty, or property. Id. at 371. See infra note 215 for a discussion
of possible equal protection claims for legal immigrants.
23. See infra part L.A for relevant text in the U.S. Constitution.
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guards. These contrasting applications of the doctrine suggest that the
Court could apply procedural due process protections to legal immi-
grants attempting to qualify for food stamps under the forty qualifying
quarters exception.
A. Constitutional Background
Procedural due process is derived from the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law,"24 and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's mandate "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law."'2 These provisions do
not ban all government interference with life, liberty, or property;
rather, they demand that if and when the federal government infringes
on these rights, it must act with procedural fairness.2s At the essence
of procedural due process is the notion that an injured party has a
right to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the dep-
rivation of a "property" or "liberty" interest.27 Moreover, procedural
due process is especially important to prevent the government from
imposing subjective criteria to determine each individual's rights.'
The Court has been somewhat unclear in interpreting constitutional
procedural due process.2 9 It has followed a middle ground: never de-
24. U.S. Const. amend. V.
25. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
26. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
27. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (holding that the students must be
given notice and a hearing before a school suspension); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 96-97 (1972) (stating that there must be an opportunity to be heard and meaning-
ful notice in a replevin case); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971)
(holding due process demands an individual receive notice and an opportunity to
present his side of the matter); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard are essential safeguards for accurate judgment); Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (holding that "the fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard"). It is also important that the government provide
notice and the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate manner. See Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (stating that the opportunity to be heard "is an op-
portunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner");
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-8, at 512 nn.45-46 (1978).
28. See Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437 (stating that fair procedures eliminate an
official's "caprice" in the adjudicative process); see also infra note 215 (discussing
equal protection issues for legal immigrants).
29. See A.C. Pritchard, Note, Government Promises and Due Process: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the "New Property", 77 Va. L. Rev. 1053, 1061 (1991) (stating that
the Court has not been consistent in procedural due process cases). Compare Bi-Me-
talli Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding that the
democratic process, not procedural due process, protects the property of individuals)
with Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985) (allowing across the board food
stamp benefit reductions with some notice requirement) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254,264 (1970) (holding that a welfare recipient must be granted an evidentiary
hearing before termination of welfare benefits). But, the Court had taken a broad
view of what constitutes "liberty" and "property" in substantive due process cases.
1997] 2069
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fining a property interest absent positive legislation to support such an
interest, yet denying the legislature the power to completely limit the
full scope of any one benefit." This interpretation of procedural due
process creates some confusion because the legislature is permitted to
establish any property interest; however, the same legislature is pre-
vented from altering that interest in the manner it wants without
proper process.31
B. Goldberg v. Kelly-Procedural Due Process in the
Welfare Setting
In Goldberg v. Kelly,32 the Court recognized government entitle-
ments as interests in "liberty" or "property" which could not be taken
away without procedural due process.33 Welfare payments for a per-
See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage and
procreation as basic liberties); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(holding that there is a liberty interest in choosing to have your children educated in
private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that working
as a German language professor was a liberty interest).
30. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 597 (1987) ("Unless the Legislative
Branch's decisions run afoul of some constitutional edict, any inequities created by
such decisions must be remedied by the democratic processes."); Mathews v. De Cas-
tro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (stating that governmental decisions to improve the gen-
eral public welfare are not to be determined by the courts because the discretion
usually belongs to Congress); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3
Yale J.L. & Feminism 189, 200 (1991) (maintaining that "[d]ue process protects peo-
ple from being deprived, by their government, of only those things their government
has chosen to allow them to keep").
31. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124-26 (1990) (stating that if legislation lacks
adequate procedural safeguards, as mandated by the Due Process Clause, courts must
protect the interests of the parties affected from arbitrary government action); Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (holding that the Constitu-
tion and the Due Process Clause provide rights that cannot be taken away without
adequate procedure); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982)
(stating that the Due Process Clause prevents states from denying individuals their
property interest without procedural due process). Moreover, some courts have held
that judicially enforced procedures are necessary even when the issue at stake is one
of legislative policy rather than an adjudicative issue. See Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d
643, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring notice to tenants for possible rent increases in
conflict with federal legislative action); Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 639-
40 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that tenants are entitled to participate in the consideration
of rent increases); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982
Sup. Ct. Rev. 85, 85 (stating that the Court should clarify its position and give full
power to the legislatures because "[a] court that protects the legislative power to de-
fine substantive entitlements ought to give it control of process as well").
32. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
33. Id at 265-66. Before Goldberg, the Court was unwilling to find a "property"
or "liberty" interest for benefits received from the public sector. See Bailey v. Rich-
ardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that a hearing was not required for
dismissal from governmental occupation), affd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). In exercising
such reluctance, the Court was following traditional, pre-New Deal private property
doctrine. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 1973, 1980 (1996) ("The 'old' property that the Court discounted is
private property. It is created by individuals in the private sphere, with the govern-
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son statutorily entitled to receive them were not "charity," but the
Court stated were a right protected by the Constitution against arbi-
trary withdrawal.' The Court also noted that there was a "brutal
need"3 among welfare recipients for adequate process.36
Goldberg also required the government to provide an extremely
broad set of procedural protections before it could take away what the
Court found to be a "property" interest.37 In welfare cases, an eviden-
tiary hearing was required before welfare benefits could be elimi-
nated. 8 While acknowledging that the costs of these evidentiary
hearings undoubtedly would increase governmental expenditures, the
Court nonetheless recognized that the hearings would also allow wel-
fare recipients the opportunity to participate in the administrative
ment existing simply to recognize and to protect the fruits of individual labor and
capital."); see also Colleen E. Kadel, Note, Alessi v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Pub. Wel-
fare: An Analysis of the Question of Procedural Due Process, 1 Widener J. Pub. L
353, 357 (1992) (stating that before the definition of a property interest evolved into
its present form, the Court drew a line between a "right"-a legally protected interest
and a "privilege"-an interest that was less than fully protected-as the principle for
determining a property interest). With the advent of the New Deal and the modem
welfare state, the government undertook a more expansive role beyond simple taxa-
tion and economic regulations. By granting benefits for individuals in areas as diverse
as disability, elderly care, and unemployment compensation, the government may
have created legally protected interests in these benefits. Pierce, supra, at 1977-80.
34. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265. In Goldberg, the Court accepted the work of
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale LJ. 733 (1964). Reich claimed that
citizens need to extend property rights to include government benefits to protect the
independence of those individuals who rely on these benefits. ld at 785-86. He ar-
gued that government benefits were a major source of wealth in post-New Deal
America and that the law had not realized the importance of protecting individuals'
benefits. Id at 733. Moreover, individuals had a "new property" right in welfare ben-
efits and these rights had to be protected through an expansion of "scrupulous obser-
vance of fair procedure." Id. at 783.
35. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261. The use of such passionate language comes from
Justice Brennan's personal feelings regarding welfare benefits. "For Brennan, the
wrongful denial of welfare to one person hurts everyone because it denies all of us of
that person's meaningful participation in the community." Randy Lee, Tiventy-Five
Years After Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling from the Right Spot on the Wrong Road to
the Wrong Place, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 863, 900 (1994).
36. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 ("For qualified recipients, welfare provides the
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.").
37. Ic at 265. As the Court explained:
We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor
contribute to their poverty.... Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of
subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportuni-
ties that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community.... Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to
'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity.'
Id (footnote omitted).
38. Id at 264 ("[Wlhen welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process."); see Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (requiring that a welfare recipient be given a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing because of procedural due process guarantees) (citing Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 264, 266-71).
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process. 9 In doing so, the Court claimed that the intangible value of
understanding why one's benefits are being terminated is more impor-
tant than fiscal restraint over administrative resources. 40 Thus, to af-
fect a person's property or liberty interests, the full procedural
safeguards used in court proceedings should be imposed-including
the rights to call witnesses, to counsel, and to cross examine.4'
After Goldberg, it was apparent that more and more federal gov-
ernment actions could be deemed to impair "liberty" or "property"
interests. Between 1970 and 1972 the Court expanded procedural due
process protections to numerous new property and liberty interests
that were previously viewed solely as privileges.42 The decision in
Goldberg indicated that welfare, and possibly other governmental en-
titlements like food stamps, were given strict procedural due process
protections.43
C. Creating a Framework for Procedural Due Process Analysis
Following Goldberg, the Court, in analyzing the constitutionality of
government actions affecting benefits, had to determine whether an
individual had been deprived of an interest in "life," "liberty," or
"property."'  If the Court determined that the interest at hand was
not a life, liberty, or property interest, it inquired no further into the
39. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-66; see Davis, supra note 19, § 7.02, at 115 (claiming
that the "party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a determination of
governmental action should be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet...
unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts").
40. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265-66.
41. Id at 268-71.
42. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding a property inter-
est when the government has made an implied contractual provision regarding a state
college professor's tenure); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)
(holding that when a person's reputation is at stake because of governmental actions,
"notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential"); Pierce, supra note 33, at 1980
(claiming that the Court's actions during this period vastly expanded procedural due
process protections); see also Robert McAuliffe, A Procedural Due Process Argument
for Proportionality Review in Capital Sentencing, 21 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 385,
399 (1988) (stating that the Court expanded the meaning of liberty and property fol-
lowing Goldberg); Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1611, 1794-95 (1984) (arguing that the dynamic expansion of procedural due
process protections during the early 1970s was caused by Charles Reich's "new prop-
erty" theory and its impact on the Court in Goldberg).
43. Pierce, supra note 33, at 1978. "In a single opinion the Court transformed
welfare, and potentially all other forms of government benefits, from a mere privilege
completely unprotected by due process to a property right subject to the most strin-
gent procedural safeguards available in the United States legal system." Id. at 1977-
78. Butsee Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,276 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is obvious
that today's result does not depend on the language of the Constitution itself or the
principles of other decisions, but solely on the collective judgment of the majority as
to what would be a fair and humane procedure in this case.").
44. U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV.
2072 [Vol. 65
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adequacy of the procedure afforded the individual.45 In government
benefit cases, plaintiffs met the property interest requirement by dem-
onstrating that they were included in the statute's rule-based standard
for receipt of the benefit.16
The Court first used this framework in Board of Regents v. Roth,47
holding that due process protection applied to property interests when
an individual already has a property right in particular benefits.45 If a
person is already enjoying a benefit, he has procedural due process
rights if the benefit, or property right, is denied.4 9 As a result of
Roth's rationale, the property interest for a recipient of a government
benefit is based on the statute's definition of eligibility for the bene-
fit.50 Procedures are then needed to offer benefit recipients the ability
to prove their eligibility for the benefit.5' Because property rights
protect one's ownership claims, "a purpose of the constitutional right
to a hearing [is] to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate
those claims."52
Concerned that it had created overly expansive procedural due pro-
cess protections in cases like Goldberg, the Court began to scale back
the types of benefits which it deemed to create a "liberty" or "prop-
erty" interest and the procedural protections afforded these inter-
45. Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit Cases
in the Block Grant Era, 30 Clearinghouse Rev. 97, 98 (1996). Currently, the Court
does not examine the significance of the interest or the severity of the possible injury
to the individual. Id.
46. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. "While this Court has not at-
tempted to define with exactness the liberty ... guaranteed... it denotes... the right
of the individual... to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
47. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
48. Id at 569-70.
49. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding a property inter-
est when the government has made an implied contractual provision regarding a state
college professor's tenure); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (stating that a property interest is
not just an individual's "unilateral expectation" but a "legitimate claim of entitle-
ment" to the benefit).
50. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see Morawetz, supra note 45, at 99 (basing the property
interest for the benefit in the eligibility statute).
51. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
52. Id "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id.
2073
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ests.53 As a result of finding Goldberg-like protections unworkable,
the Court crafted a balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge.4
D. The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test
Following the initial determination of whether a property interest
exists, the test set forth in Roth, the Mathews balancing test is the
second step used in procedural due process analysis. The Mathews
test weighs the strength of constitutionally mandated procedural due
process against pragmatic considerations involved in enforcing proce-
dures. The test examines the costs of requiring a particular set of pro-
cedures and weighs them against the benefits from the use of those
procedures.55
The three key factors used in the Mathews test are: 1) the strength
of the private interest that would be affected by official action; 2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the
likelihood that administrative error will be reduced by using addi-
tional safeguards; and 3) the burden on government that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.56
Unlike welfare benefits in Goldberg, the property or liberty inter-
ests at issue in Mathews-disability payments-were not deemed as
important because disability payments were not targeted at the poor
and were not simply determined by one's financial status.5 7 While this
53. In particular, by 1978, nine cases had limited the scope of procedural due pro-
cess safeguards. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1978) (holding that terminating utility service is subject to limited procedural due
process guarantees); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978) (stating that courts are not free to impose procedures if an agency has not
gone through its full procedural process); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682
(1977) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require notice and a hearing
prior to corporal punishment for public school children); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
698-99 (1976) (holding that reputation alone is not a liberty or property interest signif-
icant enough for procedural due process protection); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334-35 (1976) (balancing the governmental and private interests to limit the ex-
tent of procedural due process protections); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975)
(holding that a ten day suspension of students was an interference with a property
right and that the students must be given notice and a hearing); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (creating the "bitter with the sweet" doctrine which states
that if government creates a property interest by conferring benefits in the form of an
entitlement, the government could also limit the procedural safeguards that attach to
that interest); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 240 (1973) (stating
that the term "hearing" did not on its own require a full evidentiary proceeding);
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742,755 (1972) (allowing an
administrative agency to proceed with exemption procedures in special situations).
54. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
55. Iad at 334-35.
56. Id
57. Id at 340-43. A recent Court decision suggests that in addition to the factors
applied in the Mathews test, the deprivation of the interest in question must also be
atypical or significant. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995). But this case's
applicability to food stamp benefits is questionable because Sandin involved a liberty
interest rather than a property interest. Id.
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may be surprising following the liberal holding of Goldberg, ostensibly
the Court in Mathews was only limiting, not eliminating, procedural
due process, and was recognizing that, in practice, pre-deprivation
hearings were both time-consuming and costly.5" This understanding
of Mathews indicates that greater procedural protections are neces-
sary for need-based programs, such as food stamps, due to their recipi-
ents' critical private interest.59
E. Procedural Due Process for Food Stamp Benefits
In Atkins v. Parker,60 a case that analyzed the implications of an
across-the-board food stamp cut, the Court stated that a food stamp
recipient has a property right in those benefits.61 Atkins held that a
recipient may not challenge a wholesale change by the legislature in
the eligibility requirements for a benefit so long as the government
provides adequate notice.62 The Court also stated, however, that if
58. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,264 (1970) (finding unpersuasive the argu-
ment that pre-deprivation hearings would be too costly for the states because the
benefits at issue was the sole measure of survival for welfare recipients). The Court in
Mathews also placed more faith in the procedures of the federal government agency
that administered benefits than in the local public assistance program in Goldberg.
"In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the
good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration
of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consid-
eration of the entitlement claims of individuals." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (citation
omitted).
59. Morawetz, supra note 45, at 99. The Mathews balancing test is also counter-
intuitive in some respects. First, the test places little or no significance on an individ-
ual's basic dignitary interest in fair procedures. Such procedures represent a valuable
human experience in which an individual can participate in a decision that greatly
affects his interests, and, at the same time, gain satisfaction in understanding the deci-
sion through a detailed explanation. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that the
authority and validity of the government depends on how decisions are made within
the government); Tribe, supra note 27, § 10-7, at 501 (stating that the value placed in
procedural due process historically comes from the belief that "personal freedom can
be preserved only when there is some institutional check on arbitrary government
action"). Additionally, the Mathews test requires the balancing of factors that cannot
comfortably be placed on the same scale. For example, the private interest of a single
benefit recipient differs greatly in meaning from the government's interest in cutting
budgetary expenses. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculs for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28,58 (1976) (stating that the three factors used in
the Court's balancing test are insufficient guides for analysis because the Court does
not specify the factors' suggestive values in comparison to each other). Finally, the
government also has an interest in detailed procedural requirements. A civic-spirited
government would prefer that its programs help those who were intended to be as-
sisted. See Tribe, supra note 27, § 10-13, at 540-41.
60. 472 U.S. 115 (1985).
61. Id at 128 (stating that "[flood-stamp benefits . . .'are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.' " (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
262)).
62. IdL at 129-31. "Thus, it must be assumed that Congress had plenary power to
define the scope and the duration of the entitlement to food-stamp benefits, and to
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there are questions regarding an individual's eligibility determination
under the new law, pre-deprivation hearings, like those specified in
Goldberg, are required.63
In Atkins, the petitioners commenced the action on behalf of all
Massachusetts households who had received a standardized letter of
notice that mentioned possible reductions in food stamp benefits. 6
The notice sent to food stamp recipients claimed that their benefit
levels might be decreased due to diminished funding in the federal
food stamp program.65 The notice also stated that recipients had a
right to request a hearing within ten days and that recipients' food
stamps would be continued until this hearing was held.66
Remaining consistent with its ruling in Goldberg,67 the Court held
that food stamp benefits are a form of property protected by proce-
dural due process guarantees for individuals qualified to receive
them.68 The Court noted that the procedural aspect of the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not constitutionally restrict Congress' authority to
make substantive changes in entitlement laws. 69 Furthermore, be-
cause recipients received individualized notice that specifically in-
formed them of their opportunity to request a fair hearing and gave
the recipients the right to retain their benefits until the requested
hearing, the Court held that the notice met constitutional procedural
due process requirements.70
II. PROVISIONS IN THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT
AFFECTING LEGAL IMMIGRANTS' RECEIPT
OF FOOD STAMP BENEFITS
The right to procedural due process is bestowed not by legislative
action, but by constitutional guarantee.71 Part II examines the statu-
increase, to decrease, or to terminate those benefits based on its appraisal of the rela-
tive importance of the recipients' needs and the resources available to fund the pro-
gram." Id. at 129.
63. Id at 128-29.
64. Id at 119-20.
65. Id at 120.
66. Id at 119.
67. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
68. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 128; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
69. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 129.
70. Id at 126-28. In distinguishing between Atkins and Goldberg, the Court
viewed Atkins as not concerning "the procedural fairness of individual eligibility de-
terminations," but rather as creating an across the board change in benefit levels. Id.
at 129; see also Saxon v. Department of Social Servs., 479 N.W.2d 361, 367-68 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that notice indicating that general assistance benefits would
be replaced by state disability assistance, and sent 10 days before program would end,
was constitutional under state and federal due process clauses).
71. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result in part); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (holding that the Constitution cannot be trumped by state law in
determining the procedures required for the deprivation of property rights); Morris-
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tory language of the provisions in the Personal Responsibility Act that
affect legal immigrants' receipt of food stamp benefits. As part H
demonstrates, the Personal Responsibility Act's language, which re-
lates to the denial of food stamp benefits to all legal immigrants and
its forty qualifying quarters exception, demonstrates that many consti-
tutional procedural due process questions exist within the statute.
One of the most significant reforms in the Personal Responsibility
Act is its revised rules on program ineligibility, including its unprece-
dented broad restrictions on benefits for legal immigrants.72 The Per-
sonal Responsibility Act's provisions relating to legal immigrants will
account for forty-four percent of the legislation's federal savings, ap-
proximately $23.7 billion over the next seven years.73
A. General Information on the Personal Responsibility Act's
Restrictions on Legal Immigrants
Under the Personal Responsibility Act, legal immigrants will face
three general restrictions. First, legal immigrants will neither receive
nor be eligible in the future for both supplemental security income
("SSI") and food stamps.74 Second, newly arriving legal immigrants
will be denied almost all federal need-based assistance for five years
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (stating that once due process applies, the only
question remaining is what process is due and indicating that the Court can remain
flexible in the determination of the procedures). But see Easterbrook, supra note 31,
at 110-11 (arguing that because of the inefficiency that would result, the Court should
not impose procedural protections for government benefits).
72. Legal immigrants are classified as "qualified aliens" in the legislation. Quali-
fied aliens are defined as: legal permanent residents, refugees, asylees, persons who
have had their deportation withheld, parolees admitted for at least one year, aliens
who have been present since before April 1, 1980, and conditional entrants in the
United States. The Personal Responsibility Act, Pub. L No 104-193, § 431, 110 Stat.
2105, 2274 (1996). But cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 73 (1971). This treatment
of legal immigrants goes against Rawlsian notions of justice:
[A]ssuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are at the
same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them,
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in
the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are
born.
Id
73. See Vee Burke et al., New Welfare Law: The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, CRS Rep. for Congress, Nov. 21, 1996,
at 1-3 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
74. The language for the transition period for legal immigrants receiving SSI bene-
fits states that:
during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and
ending on the date which is 1 year after such date of enactment, the Com-
missioner of Social Security shall redetermine the eligibility of any individual
who is receiving benefits under such program as of the date of the enactment
of this Act and whose eligibility for such benefits may terminate by reasons
of the provisions.
§ 402, 110 Stat. at 2263. The Personal Responsibility Act does not, however, provide
the states with guidelines to follow in eliminating benefits.
2077
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
after their arrival.' Third, a system of block grants for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF"), Title XX Social Services
Block Grant ("SSBG"),76 and Medicaid, administered by the states,
will replace other current federal entitlement programs and will allow
the states to deny legal immigrants state assistance." Consequently,
current immigrants remain eligible for all benefits except food stamps
and SSI, unless their resident state chooses to ban them from TANF,
Medicaid, and/or Title XX Social Services.
While legal immigrants lose all of these benefits, they still remain
eligible for programs, services, or assistance that are classified by the
Attorney General as necessary for the protection of life or safety.78
75. A federal public benefit is defined as:
A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license pro-
vided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the
United States; and (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or
assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment
benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are
provided... by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of
the United States.
§ 401, 110 Stat. at 2262.
Federal means-tested public benefits were originally defined as public benefits in-
cluding cash, medical, housing, and food assistance and social services of the Federal
government for which the eligibility for benefits of an individual, household, or family
eligibility unit, are determined on the basis of income, resources, or financial need of
the individual, household, or unit. Although this definition was deleted from the bill,
it was the intention of the conferees that this definition be used for purposes of the
Act. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 725, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 142 Cong. Rec.
H8829-02, H8927-02 (daily ed. July 30, 1996).
76. Title XX Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) is a block grant that states use
to fund programs such as child care and services for the elderly. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397
(1994).
77. § 401, 110 Stat. at 2113. For TANF, the language is clearly relating to the
effectiveness of the termination of benefits, but only vague procedural due process
guidelines are mentioned for states to follow. The Act merely states that "[a]n alien
who on the date of the enactment of this Act is lawfully residing in any State and is
receiving benefits [under such program] on the date of the enactment of this Act shall
continue to be eligible to receive such benefits until January 1, 1997." § 412, 110 Stat.
at 2270. States are allowed to limit the eligibility of qualified aliens for state public
benefits. A means-tested public benefit of a state or locality is any program under
which the state or locality specifies the standards for eligibility, and does not include
any federal public benefit. Again, the original definition in the proposed legislation
was deleted. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 725, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 142 Cong.
Rec. H8829-02, H8928-02 (daily ed. July 30, 1996). States have the authority to deter-
mine the eligibility of legal immigrants for state and local means-tested programs with
certain limited exceptions. §§ 411-12, 110 Stat. at 2268-69.
78. This includes:
[p]rograms, services, or assistance... specified by the Attorney General, in
the Attorney General's sole and unreviewable discretion after consultation
with appropriate Federal agencies and departments, which (i) deliver in-kind
services at the community level, including through public or private non-
profit agencies; (ii) do not condition the provision of assistance, the amount
of assistance provided, or the cost of assistance provided on the individual
recipient's income or resources; and (iii) are necessary for the protection of
life or safety.
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The Attorney General has issued a "provisional specification" of ex-
empt programs and services that deliver in-kind services at the com-
munity level and are not means-tested.7 9 These include necessary
assistance relating to child protection, mental illness and substance
abuse treatment, short-term housing assistance for the homeless and
for victims of domestic abuse, food banks, soup kitchens, and medical
public health services.'
B. The Food Stamp Program
The federal Food Stamp Program is a public social service program
established "to promote the general welfare, to safeguard the health
and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition
among low-income households.""' Congress intended for the Food
Stamp Program to "permit low-income households to obtain a more
nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food
purchasing power for all eligible households."'a The federal govern-
ment pays for the food stamps and assumes some of the states' admin-
istrative costs.s The Food Stamp Program is administered by the
Secretary of the Agriculture who promulgates "national uniform eligi-
bility standards for the Food Stamp program."'
To be eligible for food stamps, one's household income must not
exceed 130% of the Federal Poverty Income Guidelines.as In 1995,
the poverty threshold for an individual was $7,763 and for a four
member family it was $15,569. 6 That same year, 36.4 million people
in the United States were considered poor and the poverty rate was
reported at 13.8% of the United States population.Y3 Most of the
§ 401, 110 Stat. at 2261.
79. Specification of Community Programs Necessary for Protection of Life or
Safety Under Welfare Reform Legislation, 61 Fed. Reg. 45985-86 (1996).
80. Id.
81. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994). The Food Stamp Act's original purpose is to increase
the purchasing power of low-income households, abate domestic hunger, and pro-
mote the nation's health and welfare. The Food Stamp Act, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91
Stat. 958 (1977) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2032 (1994)).
82. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994); see also Bliek v. Palmer, 916 F. Supp. 1475, 1492 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (arguing that "[flood stamps... help meet the basic demands of subsis-
tence, and can help bring within the reach of the recipients the same opportunities
that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community"),
affd, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997).
83. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1994); 7 C.F.R. § 277.4 (1996).
84. Valenzuela v. Espy, 860 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (D. Ariz. 1993); see Joudeh v.
United States, 783 F.2d 176, 178 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that the Secretary of the
Agriculture promulgates such regulations as deemed necessary).
85. Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens' Access to Public Benefits:
Flawed Premise; Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L Rev. 1475, 1490 (1995).
86. Thomas Gabe, Recent Statistics on Poverty in the United States: 1995, CRS
Rep. for Congress, Sept. 30, 1996, at 2 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
87. Id at 1.
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$24.4 billion in 1995 food stamp benefits went to these individuals.88
Prior to the passage of the Personal Responsibility Act, in determin-
ing food stamp eligibility, the income and resources of an alien's spon-
sor and the sponsor's spouse, less a pro-rated share for the sponsor
and spouse, were deemed, or attributed, to legal immigrants for three
years.89 However, once the permanent bar goes into effect for food
stamp benefits, no further deeming will be necessary because all legal
immigrants will be ineligible for food stamps subject to certain
exceptions.90
C. Provisions Eliminating Food Stamps for Legal Immigrants
Already Receiving Benefits
Under one of the harshest provisions of the Personal Responsibility
Act, legal immigrants, currently receiving benefits, will have their
food stamps eligibility severely limited.91 While these individuals re-
ceive food stamp benefits in the same proportion as their percentage
of the United States population, one of the Personal Responsibility
Act's general purposes is to eliminate most legal immigrants from re-
ceiving food stampsY2 The Congressional Budget Office has esti-
mated that approximately one million aliens currently receiving food
stamps could lose eligibility as a result of this legislation.93 In fact,
subject to some limited exceptions, most immigrants will lose their
food stamp benefits until they become citizens.94
88. Id. at 2; see Daniel Mont, Welfare and Immigrants: Restricting the Eligibility of
Legal Immigrants for Welfare Programs, MigrationWorld Mag., Jan. 1, 1996, at 20.
The overall policy of denying legal immigrants food stamp benefits is confusing con-
sidering that in 1992 legal immigrants received food stamps in the same proportion
(4.8%) as their share (4-5%) of the United States population. Id. at 22.
89. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(i) (1994).
90. See generally Boswell, supra note 85, at 1495 (stating that the most common
outcome of the new deeming requirements is that the immigrant is no longer eligible
for food stamps). The term "deeming" means that an immigrant's sponsor and
spouse's income and resources are viewed as available to an immigrant when deter-
mining program eligibility for food stamps with no allowance for the needs of the
sponsor's family. The Personal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 421, 110
Stat. 2105, 2270-71 (1996). The new deeming requirements apply only to immigrants
whose sponsors sign new legally enforceable affidavits of support which must be put
into use by March 1997. Id. at 2263. These deeming requirements may be unconstitu-
tional for legal immigrants. El Souri v. Department of Social Serv., 414 N.W.2d 679,
682-83 (Mich. 1987) (holding that provisions that deemed income of an alien sponsor
as income of the alien in determining eligibility for general assistance benefits were
subject to strict scrutiny for purposes of equal protection analysis).
91. § 402, 110 Stat. at 2262-63. In general, the Act increases each state's role in
the Food Stamp Program, adds new work requirements, and significantly limits the
availability of future benefits for individuals. §§ 741-891, 110 Stat. at 2307-47. See
Vee Burke et al., supra note 73, at 3-4.
92. See Mont, supra note 88, at 20; see also supra notes 86-87 for statistics on food
stamp benefits and recipient's benefit levels.
93. 142 Cong. Rec. S8524 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
94. § 402, 110 Stat. at 2262-63.
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The Personal Responsibility Act grandfathers currently participat-
ing aliens until their recertification. 95 Legal immigrants who are cur-
rently receiving food stamps must be recertified between April 1, 1997
and August 22, 1997, one year after the legislation was enacted.96
Those aliens who have not been naturalized or are not in one of the
categories of aliens excepted from the termination of benefits will not
be recertified and will have their benefits discontinued sometime
before August 22, 1997.97 These legal immigrants will then no longer
be eligible for food stamps.98
D. Forty Quarter Exception
Certain exceptions in the Personal Responsibility Act will allow
some legal immigrants to continue to receive food stamps.99 One such
exception provides that legal immigrants who have worked for forty
qualifying quarters will remain eligible for food stamps.100 The term
95. Id at 2264.
96. Id at 2263-64. Originally, the provisions were only supposed to allow legal
immigrants to receive benefits until January 1, 1997. Id. at 2265. Because, in some
states, the state food stamp agencies recertify recipients for food stamp eligibility
every three or six months, many immigrants could have lost their benefits by the early
part of 1997. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 amended the Personal Responsibility Act and delayed its implementation until
April 1, 1997 for current food stamp recipients who are legal immigrants. "[Tihe spec-
ified Federal program... ineligibility ... shall not apply until April 1, 1997, to an alien
who received benefits under such program on the date of enactment of this Act .... "
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L
No. 104-208, § 510, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
97. § 402, 110 Stat. at 2263-64. "[T]he State agency shall, at the time of the recer-
tification, recertify the eligibility of any individual who is receiving benefits ... as of
the date of enactment of this Act and whose eligibility for such benefits may termi-
nate by reason of the provisions. . . ." Id
98. The model underlying this statute has been criticized. See, e.g., Legomsky,
supra note 2, at 1463 (arguing that this type of dichotomous method, wherein legal
immigrants lose their eligibility for food stamps, may not be as effective as a contin-
uum model, in which legal immigrants would have benefits in proportion to the
amount of time they have been in the United States).
99. These include exceptions for refugees, asylees, and those granted withholding
of deportation. § 402, 110 Stat. at 2262. These groups are eligible only for benefits
during their first five years in the United States. If a refugee, asylee, or one granted
withholding of deportation has already been in the U.S. for five years, food stamp and
other governmental benefits will no longer be made available. Id.
Additionally, veterans, active duty military, spouses, and dependents can also re-
ceive benefits. The Personal Responsibility Act classifies as veterans individuals
"with a discharge characterized as an honorable discharge and not on account of
alienage." Id. at 2263. Moreover, a veteran or active duty member's wife and depen-
dent child are covered by this exception. Id.
100. The Personal Responsibility Act states that a qualified alien is eligible for any
designated federal program
if the alien: is lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent resi-
dence under the Immigration and Nationality Act; and ... worked 40 quali-
fying quarters of coverage as defined under title II of the Social Security Act
or can be credited with such qualifying quarters... and in the case of any
such qualifying quarter creditable for any period beginning after December
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"quarter," as defined by the Social Security Act, means any of the
four three-calendar-month periods ending with March 31, June 30,
September 30, and December 31 of any year.1 1 Social Security cred-
its for these qualifying quarters are earned by working either as an
employee or as a self-employed individual'* 2
Minor children and spouses can be credited with the qualifying
quarters of their supporters. °3 A child can count those quarters
worked by a parent while the child was under the age of eighteen. 1° 4
A legal immigrant can also count all qualifying quarters worked by a
spouse during their marriage provided that the legal immigrant re-
mains married to his spouse or his spouse has died.' 05
III. PROCEDURES FOR LEGAL IMMIGRANTS DENIED
FOOD STAMP BENEFITS
Legal immigrants currently receiving food stamp benefits must go
through the process of recertification to determine whether they are
still eligible to receive food stamps under the Personal Responsibility
Act. 0 6 This part provides a detailed explanation about the proce-
dures involved in recertifying legal immigrants for food stamp bene-
31, 1996, did not receive any Federal means-tested public benefit... during
any such period.
§ 402, 110 Stat. at 2264-65.
101. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.102, 404.140(a), 404.143(a) (1996). All types of earnings fol-
low this nile. A maximum of four quarterly credits can be earned each year. For 1978
and later, credits are based solely on the total yearly amount of earnings. The amount
of earnings needed to earn a credit increases and is different for each year. For 1978
through 1996, the amount of earnings needed for each credit is an amount based on a
formula which reflects yearly national increases in average wages. Thus, for example,
a $250 quarter in 1978 will qualify, and this amount is adjusted incrementally to reflect
rates of inflation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.143(a) (1996). Yet, for any quarters worked after
January 1, 1997, legal immigrants will not be able to count a quarter in which they
received any federal means-tested public benefits. § 402, 110 Stat. at 2264-65.
102. For 1978 through 1996, the amount of earnings needed to establish a credit
are: 1978-$250, 1979-$260, 1980-$290, 1981-$310, 1982-$340, 1983-$370,
1984-$390, 1985-$410, 1986-$440, 1987-$460, 1988-$470, 1989-$500, 1990-
$520, 1991-$540, 1992-$570, 1993-$590, 1994-$620, 1995-$630, and 1996-
$640. Letter from Yvette S. Jackson, Deputy Administrator, Food Stamp Program, to
All Regional Administrators, Food and Consumer Service (Oct. 18, 1996), at 4 [here-
inafter Letter to Regional Administrators] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
103. The Personal Responsibility Act states:
For purposes of this title, in determining the number of qualifying quarters
of coverage under title II of the Social Security Act an alien shall be credited
with-(1) all of the qualifying quarters of coverage as defined under title II
of the Social Security Act worked by a parent of such alien while the alien
was under age 18, and (2) all of the qualifying quarters worked by a spouse
of such alien during their marriage and the alien remains married to such
spouse or such spouse is deceased.
§ 435, 110 Stat. at 2275.
104. Id
105. Id-
106. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Personal Respon-
sibility Act's recertification provisions).
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fits. Part IV then analyzes whether these procedures meet due
process requirements.
A. States' Food Stamp Recertification Procedures
Applicants for most federal, state, and local benefit programs will
be subject to new verification criteria to determine if they are quali-
fied aliens who are eligible for benefits.0 7 The Personal Responsibil-
ity Act allows states additional flexibility in administrative options for
food stamp recipients. 08 For legal immigrants, who through the
recertification process will find out whether or not they can continue
to receive food stamps, the state agency'09 must establish "procedures
for notifying households of expiration dates, providing application
forms, scheduling interviews, and recertifying eligible households
prior to the expiration of certification periods."" 0 The state agency
107. § 432, 110 Stat. at 2274. The Personal Responsibility Act specifies that "[n]ot
later than 18 months after the date of the enactment... the Attorney General of the
United States, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
shall promulgate regulations requiring verification that a person applying for a Fed-
eral public benefit... is a qualified alien and is eligible to receive such benefit." Id.
States also must comply with new verification systems: "[n]ot later than 24 months
after the date the regulations [described above] are adopted, a State that administers
a program that provides a Federal public benefit shall have in effect a verification
system that complies with the regulations." Id. at 2275.
108. § 840,110 Stat. at 2331. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in carry-
ing out the food stamp program, a State agency shall not be required to use an income
and eligibility or an immigration status verification system established under section
1137 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320b-7)." Id The Income and Eligibility
Verification System (the "IEVS") is a system in which the state agency coordinates
the exchange of information with other federal benefit programs and adheres to stan-
dardized procedures in trading information with other federal programs and agencies.
7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (1996). Previously, states had to use the IEVS to assist in verifying
household circumstances, financial situations, and alien status. 7 C.F.R. §§ 272.1,272.8
(1996). Use of the IEVS is now optional with the states. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 725,
104th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 142 Cong. Rec. H8829-02, H8951 (daily ed. July 30,
1996). The Personal Responsibility Act permits states to determine their own training
needs, and authorizes the Simplified Food Stamp Program, through which states can
employ a single set of rules for their state cash assistance programs and the Food
Stamp Program. § 854, 110 Stat. at 2340-42. The simplified program allows for a sin-
gle set of rules and procedures to determine eligibility and benefits for food stamps,
and standardizes the deductions between programs. See Vee Burke et al., supra note
73, at 3-4. A state's simplified plan may not increase costs to the federal government.
If it does, the state must enter into and carry out a corrective action plan, or the
Secretary must terminate the state's simplified program. § 854, 110 Stat. at 2340-42.
109. A state agency is defined as an agency "which is responsible for the adminis-
tration of the federally aided public assistance programs within the State, and in those
States where such assistance programs are operated on a decentralized basis, it in-
cludes the counterpart local agencies which administer such assistance programs for
the State agency." 7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (1996).
110. Food Stamp Program: Simplification of Program Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 54303,
54318 (1996) [hereinafter Food Stamp Simplification] (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.14(a)). In determining legal immigrants eligibility for food stamps, states are
given the opportunity to decide whether to rely on: 1) self-certification of legal immi-
grants, 2) reviewing the documents presented by the legal immigrant, or 3) services
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will provide legal immigrants already receiving benefits with a notice
of expiration at the time of certification. 111 This expiration notice" 2
must contain detailed information regarding the termination of food
stamp benefits, and the different options available for legal immi-
grants following termination of benefits."
The recertification process provides procedural safeguards to en-
sure that if a legal immigrant's benefits are terminated, the action is
taken justly. Legal immigrants are given at least ten days to provide
the required verification information." 4 Furthermore, the recertifica-
tion form that the legal immigrant completes must contain adequate
data relating to the immigrant's income and resources that, when ad-
ded to information already included in the case file, leads to a reliable
determination of eligibility and benefits." 5 As part of the recertifica-
tion process, the state agency holds a face-to-face interview with each
provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Services ("INS") and explore the
possibility of signing up with the SAVE program which administers INS's current sta-
tus verification system. SAVE (System for Alien Verification of Eligibility) was
designed by Congress to prevent undocumented aliens from receiving benefits. See
Boswell, supra note 85, at 1495-96. Under SAVE, states and other localities can verify
the eligibility of legal immigrants for benefits by using INS computer records. 7 C.F.R.
§§ 272.1, 272.8 (1996).
111. Food Stamp Simplification, supra note 110, at 54318.
112. Adequate notice means a written statement that includes a summary of what
the agency has done or plans to do. Additionally, notice must include:
the reason for the intended action; the household's right to request a fair
hearing; the name of the person to contact for additional information; the
availability of continued benefits; and the liability of the household for any
overissuances received while awaiting a fair hearing if the hearing official's
decision is adverse to the household. Depending on the timing of a State's
system and the timeliness of report submission by participating households,
such notice may be received prior to agency action, at the time reduced ben-
efits are received, or, if benefits are terminated, at the time benefits would
have been received if they had not been terminated. In all cases, however,
participants will be allowed ten days from the mailing date of the notice to
contest the agency action and to have benefits restored to their previous
level.
7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (1996).
113. Included among these are: the date the certification period expires, the date
by which an application for recertification must be submitted to continue benefits, the
consequences of not applying for recertification in a timely manner, notice of the right
to receive an application form and to have it accepted if it contains a signature and a
legible name and address, information on submission options available to individuals
who cannot come into the certification office, the address of the office where the
application must be filed, the individual's ability to request a fair hearing if recertifica-
tion is denied, notice that failure to attend an interview could result in denial of bene-
fits, and notice that the individual is responsible for providing required verification
information. Food Stamp Simplification, supra note 110, at 54318.
114. Id. "Any [individual] whose eligibility is not determined by the end of its
current certification period due to the time period allowed for submitting any missing
verification shall receive an opportunity to participate, if eligible, within 5 working
days after the [individual] submits the missing verification." Id.
115. Id.
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legal immigrant who seeks one." 6 Critics have claimed that this kind
of "fair hearing" interview generally is unsatisfactory and unhelpful
for individuals seeking redress. 17
When legal immigrants complete their application requirements
and the state agency has processed their applications, legal immigrants
are then notified of their eligibility for food stamp benefits by the end
of their current certification period. The state agency must then pro-
vide legal immigrants determined eligible for food stamps an opportu-
nity to participate in the normal issuance cycle in the month following
the end of the current certification period.118 If the legal immigrant is
denied benefits under a forty qualifying quarters claim, additional
procedures are used to determine if the legal immigrant qualifies for
food stamps.
B. Procedures for Legal Immigrants with Forty Qualifying
Quarters' Claims
1. Initial Procedures for Eligibility Determination
To initially determine eligibility for legal immigrants who assert
claims under the forty qualifying quarter exception, the United States
Department of Agriculture has required state agencies to ascertain
the individual's understanding as to the following: 1) how many years
the legal immigrant, his spouse, or his parents-before the applicant
turned eighteen-have lived in the United States; and 2) the number
of those years in which the legal immigrant, his spouse, or his parents
earned money through employment." 9 If the applicants answer the
second question indicating a period of ten years or more, the state
agency must contact the Immigration and Naturalization Services
116. Id
117. See Haskins v. Stanton, 794 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that admin-
istrative hearings for food stamp recipients "do nothing to redress violations of the
[Food Stamp] Act that prevent applicants from obtaining a timely decision"); Karen
Terhune, Comment, Reformation of the Food Stamp Acv Abating Domestic Hunger
Means Resisting "Legislative Junk Food", 41 Cath. U. L Rev. 421,444 (1992) (claim-
ing that this process, while good in theory, is unsatisfactory because persons who are
eligible, but wrongly precluded from benefits, lack the resources necessary to fully
understand their rights within the confusion and delays of the food stamp
bureaucracy).
118. If there are delays in processing caused by the state agency, those who "have
submitted an application for recertification in a timely manner ... shall receive an
immediate opportunity to participate upon being determined eligible .... If the
household was unable to participate... because of State agency error, the household
is entitled to restored benefits." Food Stamp Simplification, supra note 110, at 54319.
"If a household does not submit a new application by the end of the certification
period, the State agency must close the case without further action." Id
119. Letter to Regional Administrators, supra note 102, at 2. This letter was sent to
all state welfare commissioners to provide guidance for implementing the forty quali-
fying quarters determination. Until regulations are published, state agencies are ex-
pected to follow these procedures. Id at 1.
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("INS") to verify the date of United States entry of the legal immi-
grant, his spouse, or his parents.12
If the dates are consistent with having ten or more years of work, no
additional documentation is required at this point, and the state
agency will allow the legal immigrant to continue receiving food
stamps pending further eligibility determinations by the Social Secur-
ity Administration ("SSA").121 If the dates of United States entry
make it impossible to have ten or more years of work, the state agency
is instructed to determine the legal immigrant ineligible.'22 The state
agency will then inform the legal immigrant of interview rights. The
legal immigrant can then produce, for purposes of future verification,
the full name, date of birth, social security number, and sex of each
individual-self, parent, or spouse-whose work history is relevant to
the determination of eligibility.'2 3 In addition, the legal immigrant
will provide a release form signed by each such individual giving the
SSA permission to release information on that individual to the state
agency and the legal immigrant.' 4 This release form requirement is
one aspect of the initial procedures for legal immigrants with forty
qualifying quarter claims that is problematic in terms of guaranteeing
procedural due process.
2. Procedures After Social Security Administration Verification
System Becomes Operational
Within three months after the SSA verification system becomes op-
erational, the state agency will send the identifying information pro-
vided by the legal immigrant to the SSA for overnight processing. 2 5
The SSA will respond to the state agencies by providing information
about the legal immigrant's qualifying quarters of work.'2 6 If the legal
immigrant believes that the SSA relied on inaccurate or incomplete
information, the state agency will refer the applicant to the SSA for
review.'17 The SSA will then send each legal immigrant's employment
history to the states.' 28
If the SSA's records do not confirm a legal immigrant's claim of
forty quarters and the individual maintains that the Administration
120. I at 2.
121. Id This means that if a legal immigrant, alone or in combination with parents
or spouse, spent enough time in the U.S. to have forty quarters of coverage, the indi-
vidual only needs to state that he or she had met the forty quarter exception to main-
tain food stamp benefits. Thus, this aspect of the process meets procedural due
process guarantees.
122. kd
123. Idt
124. Id This form will be kept in the case file to document the legal immigrant's
consent.
125. Id at 3.
126. Idt
127. Idt
128. Idt
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has erred, the SSA will assist the legal immigrant in trying to establish
additional quarters.'29 Legal immigrants in this situation will be al-
lowed to participate in the food stamp program for six more months if
the Administration certifies that it is investigating the claim.13 To
continue receiving benefits for this six-month period, the individual
will have to provide the state agency with a document from the SSA
stating that the number of quarters is under review.13 ' This aspect of
the procedures appears to meet procedural due process guarantees.
3. Procedures After Either Administrative Review or Receiving
Food Stamps for Six-Months
The SSA will then issue a document to the legal immigrant indicat-
ing the number of quarters that are under review. 32 A legal immi-
grant who provides the state agency with this document can continue
to receive benefits for six months from the date of the SSA's initial
response or until the SSA has completed its review, whichever is ear-
lier.133 If the SSA is still unable to establish that the individual has
reached forty qualifying quarters, the legal immigrant subsequently
will be barred from receiving food stamp benefits.'3
C. Social Security Administration's Review Process
The SSA's eligibility procedures for social security, SSI, and Medi-
care would be used to determine the validity of a legal immigrant's
qualifying quarters claim. 35 The SSA's hearing process usually takes
at least a year, however, which is longer than the six month grace pe-
129. Id at 1-2.
130. I& at 3.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. Id
134. See id. If the legal immigrant does not meet the exception, the state agency
shall establish an inadvertent household error claim for the over-issuance-the
amount paid to the claimant during this period-unless the individual knowingly pro-
vides false information. Id. at 2.
135. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (1996). The administrative process for review has sev-
eral steps. First, an initial determination about the entitlement is made by the SSA. If
an individual is dissatisfied with the SSA's initial determination and subsequent rd-
ings, he may ask the SSA to reconsider its original determination and request a hear-
ing before an administrative law judge. If still not satisfied, he may request that the
SSA's Appeals Council review the decision. Id
The SSA also has an expedited appeals process that can be used if all of the follow-
ing requirements are met: i) the Administration has made an initial and a reconsid-
ered determination; ii) an administrative law judge has made a hearing decision or
Appeals Council review has been requested, but a final decision has not been issued;
iii) the party to the reconsidered determination or hearing decision has submitted a
written request; and iv) the individual affected has claimed, and the Administration
agrees, that the only factor preventing a favorable determination or decision is a pro-
vision in the law that is believed to be unconstitutional. 20 C.F.RL § 404.924 (1996).
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riod provided in the Personal Responsibility Act.136 If food stamp
benefits were terminated within six months, a legal immigrant would
be irreparably harmed before the Administration would have finally
decided the forty qualifying quarters claim. 137 Thus, legal immigrants
facing removal under the Personal Responsibility Act should have full
procedural due process safeguards throughout this onerous process,
such as pre-deprivation evidentiary hearings. These protections can-
not be eliminated by the Department of Agriculture's unilateral ter-
mination actions where the exercise of legal immigrants' food stamp
property rights depends on a six-month time limit that is incompatible
with the eligibility procedures used by the SSA that legal immigrants
have no control over.13
8
Administering these immigrant restrictions for food stamps will im-
pose tremendous burdens on state and local governments. 139 Verifica-
tion systems currently used by the states merely act as fraud detection
systems to recognize possible overpayments and potential duplicate
assistance. 140 These verification systems may not accurately deter-
136. Social Security and Disability Insurance Program, 1995: Hearings on Managing
the Social Security Disability Insurance Program Before the Subcomm. on Social Se-
curity of the House Ways and Means Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1995) (state-
ment of Jim Bunning, Chairman, Subcomm. on Social Security) (maintaining that the
Social Security Administration must do a better job with backlogs, waiting times, and
overdue reviews). For example, the average disabled applicant has to wait three
months to have an initial application processed by the SSA. John B. O'Donnell, GOP
Criticizes Delays in Disability Cases: But Members Fear Too Many Payments, Balti-
more Sun, May 24, 1995, at 3A. An appeal that goes to a judge takes another thirteen
months. Id.; see also Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief but upon the Terms of Coming into
the House".-Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements and Homelessness in an Ur-
ban Shelter System, 104 Yale L.J. 2157, 2211 (1995) (stating that these slow administra-
tive processes discourage applicants because "[t]he injuries inflicted on the applicant
are repeated and intense: the loss of an application, the disregard of waiting lists, the
dispensing of conflicting information, and the hours of waiting without any informa-
tion at all"). Legal immigrant food stamp recipients with forty qualifying quarter
claims will have to go through detailed verification processes with local food stamp
offices, the SSA, and the INS to continue receiving benefits. These detailed verifica-
tion processes are a form of "verification extremism" that will discourage and prevent
legal immigrants from receiving food stamp benefits.
137. See supra part II.B (discussing the necessity of food stamps and the problem of
poverty in the United States). Additionally, the Social Security Administration does
not have the power to limit the constitutional protections that accompany an entitle-
ment before its termination. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541
(1985) (holding that the Constitution cannot be trumped by a law that determines the
procedures required for the deprivation of property rights).
138. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,433-35 (1982) (holding that
a 120 day limit for state fact-finding procedures that extinguished an individual's
property interest in a cause of action deprived individual of procedural due process);
Morawetz, supra note 45, at 106.
139. Broad Policy Goals of Welfare Reform, 1995: Hearing on Governor's Welfare
Proposals Before the Committee on Finance of the Senate, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8-9
(1995) (statement of Robert Greenstein, Executive Director, Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities).
140. Testimony on Welfare Fraud Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of
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mine whether a legal immigrant should be denied aid. 1 ' As a result,
many legal immigrants may be denied food stamp benefits as a result
of the Personal Responsibility Act. Thus, the procedures used to de-
termine whether a legal immigrant should have his or her benefits
eliminated should be analyzed to ensure that such procedures are con-
stitutionally adequate.
IV. APPLYING PROCEDURAL DuE PROCESS TO THE FOOD STAMP
PROVISIONS OF THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
Procedural due process analysis requires a two-step inquiry. 42
First, the court must determine whether the individuals in question
have been deprived of a constitutionally protected interest in "life,"
"liberty," or "property."'14 3 At this step, the Court looks only to
whether the interest at hand fits one of the designated categories.'"
If the interest is not classifiable as either life, liberty, or property,
there is no due process interest and hence no further inquiry into the
adequacy of the procedure due to the individual.145 If, however, this
prong is satisfied because the individual has such a protectable inter-
est, the second prong of the inquiry is activated-what process is due?
As stated above, the Court has accepted the concept of food stamps
as property. 46 Consequently, legal immigrants possess a constitu-
tional right in their entitlements that requires a certain level of proce-
dural fairness before stripping them of their benefits. This part
analyzes the due process rights of food stamp recipients in light of the
Personal Responsibility Act, and demonstrates that under current
Supreme Court precedent, the harm to legal immigrants and the likeli-
hood of administrative error mandate a full evidentiary hearing prior
to eliminating food stamp benefits from legal immigrants.147
Bruce Wagstaff, Deputy Director Welfare Programs Division California Department
of Social Services), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 276573 (using the verification
problems that exist in California as an example of the welfare fraud that many other
states will now face).
141. Id.
142. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,428 (1982); Bliek v Palmer, 916
F. Supp. 1475, 1485 (N.D. Iowa 1996), aff'd, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997); see Tribe,
supra note 27, §§ 10-12 to 10-13, at 532-43; Pierce, supra note 33, at 1998.
143. U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV.
144. Morawetz, supra note 45, at 98 (arguing that the Court does not examine the
significance of the interest or the severity of the possible injury to the individual).
145. Id
146. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985); see supra note 68 and accompany-
ing text.
147. See infra note 209 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 266-67 (1970) (stating that pre-termination evidentiary hearings are necessary in
the welfare setting). However, the Court did not place an affirmative duty on the
government to provide basic subsistence, the only governmental obligation was suffi-
cient constitutional procedures. Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children,
Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 Ohio St. LJ. 519, 523
(1996). This reading of the Constitution is consistent with the view that the document
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A. Attaching a Property Interest to the Legal Immigrant's
Food Stamp Benefits
Food stamp recipients satisfy the first step of a due process inquiry
by showing that they meet the statute's rule based standard for receipt
of the benefit. 4 ' As stated in Atkins, food stamp benefits are entitle-
ments that should be "treated as a form of 'property' protected by the
Due Process Clause."'14 9 Specifically, the legal immigrants affected by
the Personal Responsibility Act can retain their benefits by an individ-
ualized showing that they meet the forty qualifying quarters excep-
tion.' 50 The Personal Responsibility Act explicitly allows legal
immigrants, minors, and spouses who have either worked forty quali-
fying quarters or have been supported by a parent or spouse who has
worked forty qualifying quarters to continue to receive food
stamps.' 5 ' Those legal immigrants who meet the forty qualifying
quarters test have a property right in their food stamp benefits and
satisfy the first-prong of the due process inquiry.' 52
is composed of negative rights that restrain the government from infringing on basic
rights. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196(1989). But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
2271, 2273-74 (1990) (claiming that the negative rights view of the Constitution is
flawed); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreward: On Protect-
ing the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 13-14 (1969)
(arguing that the government has an affirmative obligation under the Constitution to
provide assistance to the needy).
148. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 128; see supra note 68 and accompanying text for Atkins'
explanation of property interest in food stamp benefits; see also Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (" 'While this Court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty... guaranteed... it denotes.., the right of the individual ... to
enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.' " (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
149. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 128.
150. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Personal
Responsibility Act's forty qualifying quarter exception.
151. The Personal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402, 110 Stat. 2105,
2264-65 (1996). See supra note 103 for text of statutory provision. The term "qualify-
ing quarter" is interpreted to mean a three calendar month period in which an Mdi-
vidual reaches a certain level of income. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying
text for a further discussion on qualifying quarters.
152. See Morawetz, supra note 45, at 104; see also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
313-54 (1986) (providing a basis for a less practical and more theoretical justification
for allowing legal immigrants to possess a property interest in their food stamp bene-
fits). Professor Dworkin does not believe in interpreting statutes simply to follow
legislative intent. Rather, he argues statutes should be interpreted in "the best light
overall," in view of concerns for justice, wise policy, the ideals of political integrity
and fairness, and procedural due process. Id at 338; cf. Gregory v. Pittsfield, 470 U.S.
1018, 1021 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the
Court has never addressed the issue of whether applicants for general assistance have
a protected property interest). However, the logic of Roth, discussed in supra notes
50-52 and accompanying text, extends to the denial of food stamps to legal immi-
grants attempting to qualify under the forty quarters exception. But see Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 19.5, at 529-30 (1992) (suggesting that statutes
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B. Process Due to Legal Immigrant's Food Stamp Benefits
Step two of the analysis involves the balancing test used in Mathews
v. Eldridge153 which weighs the strength of constitutionally mandated
procedural due process with pragmatic considerations involved in the
enforcement of procedures. 54  When the government attempts to
take away what the Court finds to be a property interest, the Court
applies the Mathews balancing test to determine what procedural pro-
tections are required. 55 If under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
test 56 the amount at stake for legal immigrants multiplied by the like-
lihood of reducing administrative error through additional procedures
is greater than the cost of new administrative safeguards, additional
administrative procedures are required to preserve the procedural due
process rights of legal immigrants.5 7
1. Amount at Stake for the Legal Immigrant
While courts have stressed the importance of non-means-tested
benefits to individuals,'158 in a means-tested program like food stamps,
legal immigrants have a stronger claim to the benefits. 15 9 This is be-
cause the harm to the individual that would occur as a result of food
stamp deprivation is greater than in a non-means-tested program. 60
Food stamp recipients are often desperately in need of assistance and
face hunger and malnutrition if removed from the program. 61 If legal
can be faithfully interpreted by understanding and enforcing the underlying economic
logic of a statute).
153. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
154. See supra part I.D for a further discussion of Mathews.
155. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
156. Id. See supra part I.D for a discussion of the Mathews balancing factors.
157. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. In a mathematical example if the amount at
stake for the legal immigrant is $1000, the likelihood of reducing administrative error
by using additional procedures is 60%, and the government's cost in using additional
procedural safeguards is $400. Because $1000 x 60% is greater than $400, the addi-
tional procedures should be used.
158. See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting
the lower court's assumption that even non-means based Medicare benefits of less
than $100 involved minimal private interests and holding that non-reimbursed medi-
cal bills of "$100 represent a substantial loss" to Medicare recipients).
159. See Mattem v. Mathews, 582 F.2d 248, 254-55 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that
recoupment of social security benefits from an individual does not present as strong
an interest as the strong private interest in means-based benefits), cert. denied, 443
U.S. 912 (1979). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for the Court's discus-
sion of the significance of financial status in determining the necessity of full proce-
dural safeguards.
160. See Morawetz, supra note 45, at 101. While both social security and food
stamps are property interests, social security is not means-tested, but rather is an in-
surance program for Americans. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The
Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L Rev. 361, 377-78 (1996)
(stating that social insurance differs from public assistance because insurance does not
rely on means testing and has no social stigma).
161. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text for statistics on poverty in the
United States and the use of food stamps to alleviate the poverty problem.
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immigrants are denied essential food stamp benefits that are provided
for them in the Personal Responsibility Act, they needlessly run the
risk of starvation. 162
Moreover, legal immigrants have another, intangible, interest at
stake. Namely, they possess a right to have their autonomy protected
by participating in the process of eligibility determination and receiv-
ing a reasoned explanation as to why their food stamp benefits are
being taken away. Many individuals, including Socorro Cruz, have
difficulty understanding the requirements for meeting the forty quar-
ter exception that will allow certain legal immigrants to continue to
receive food stamps."6 To deny a legal immigrant an adequate oppor-
tunity to show his eligibility for food stamps when his property is at
stake requires justification, not only because the legal immigrant
might help the administrative agency make an accurate determination,
but also because a lack of personal involvement causes a loss of dig-
nity and self-respect that society holds independently valuable. 165
Thus, the magnitude of the harm that legal immigrants would suffer if
their food stamp benefits were eliminated heightens their interests in
the benefits.
In a very recent case, Bliek v. Palmer,166 a federal district court
noted that the private interest at stake in food stamps is "extremely
significant" because "[flood is a necessity of life."'167 The loss of food
stamp benefits would force individuals to live at levels below subsis-
tence.' 68 Similarly, other courts have held that an individual's prop-
erty interest is particularly compelling in elderly disability cases,
162. See supra notes 92-98; see also Boswell, supra note 85, at 1478-79 (stating that
discussions simply addressing the budgetary aspects of cutting immigrants' benefits
have ignored the dramatic impact these reforms will have on immigrants' lives).
163. See Davis, supra note 19, § 7.02, at 115 (claiming that a party adversely af-
fected "should be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet" evidence when
there is a significant interest at stake); Tribe, supra note 27, § 10-7, at 502-03 (noting
that there is an intrinsic value in due process and the right to participate and under-
stand such processes by which decisions are made).
164. The Personal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402, 110 Stat. 2105,
2264-65 (1996).
165. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (stating that pre-termina-
tion evidentiary hearings promote the government's interest of preventing a sense of
insecurity and frustration from engulfing society); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652
F.2d 146, 161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that the reasons why society values a per-
sonal hearing are "the desire for accuracy, the need for accountability, and the neces-
sity for a decision-making procedure which is perceived as 'fair' by the citizens");
Davis, supra note 19, § 7.02, at 115; Tribe, supra note 27, § 10-7, at 502-03; Mashaw,
supra note 59, at 50.
166. 916 F. Supp. 1475 (N.D. Iowa 1996), aff'd, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997).
167. Bliek, 916 F. Supp. at 1488-89 (noting that even the slightest change in a food
stamp allotment threatens the health, well-being, and dignity of a household).
168. Id. at 1489.
169. Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 166-67; see Klein v. Mathews, 430 F. Supp. 1005,
1010 (D.N.J. 1977) (holding that elderly Medicaid patients would suffer grievous loss
if benefits received at their nursing home were terminated).
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Medicaid reduction decisions,'170 and attachment of property cases. 17 '
Due to the possibility that many legal immigrants will be denied food
stamps as a result of the Personal Responsibility Act, the private in-
terest at stake for legal immigrants is of the utmost significance.
2. Likelihood of Administrative Error
A principal reason for procedural due process safeguards is to pre-
vent inaccurate or unjust decisions." In the food stamps context, in-
eligible recipients should have an opportunity to notify the proper
governmental administrative agency if an error has been made. 7 3
With entitlement programs, such as food stamps, major changes in the
law are just as likely to cause an error than individual mistakes made
by caseworkers. 74 When state agencies are mandated to implement
the directives of vague Congressional statutes, as is the case with the
Personal Responsibility Act, they are left to proceed without proper
guidance. 75 Such a lack of guidance may lead to inadequate proce-
dures and, accordingly, a high rate of error. 176
Many legal immigrants who have worked for more than forty
quarters may not meet the forty qualifying quarter exception without
being subject to further proceedings because their income was paid
"off the books' 1 7 7 and not reported to the appropriate government
agency. While these legal immigrants have worked for forty quarters
of covered employment,178 the quarters usually are not in the records
170. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
171. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991). Courts have also found a signifi-
cant individual interest in retention of employment cases. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
434 (1982); Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of Reg'l Tramp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 629 (7th
Cir. 1995); Cain v. Virginia, 574 F. Supp. 559, 563 (W.D. Va. 1983).
172. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 142 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (stating that procedural due process is not meant to
protect individuals from any deprivation, but from an erroneous deprivation of life,
liberty, or property); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (noting that the
necessity of procedural due process is determined by the risk of error).
173. See Bliek v. Palmer, 916 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding that the
risk of erroneous deprivation is high in the food stamp context), aff'd, 102 F.3d 1472
(8th Cir. 1997); Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that de-
tailed advance notice of food stamp termination and reductions is required because of
the substantial risk of erroneous deprivation), cer. denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976).
174. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 142. Brennan claimed in his dissent that this is because
"[t]imely and adequate notice permits the affected recipient to surmise whether an
error has been made; if the recipient invokes the statutory right to a fair hearing, the
agency then determines whether the recipient is correct." Id.
175. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion surround-
ing the implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act).
176. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text (discussing administrative
error).
177. See supra note 13 (defining "off the books").
178. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1004 (a)(1996). In order for employment to be covered under
the Social Security Act, any one of the following requirements must be met:
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of the SSA, and, as such are not officially counted by the Administra-
tion. Legal immigrants are often victims of employers who did not
report the immigrant's income to the proper governmental authori-
ties. 179 These legal immigrants have no proof that they meet the stat-
ute's standard for the entitlement; and these individuals, particularly
migrant workers, will have difficulty confirming that their employ-
ment meets the forty qualifying quarter exception, even with the
assistance of the SSA. 180 As a result, there is a high probability that
without detailed evidentiary procedures these verification obstacles
will prevent legal immigrants who have worked forty qualifying
quarters from receiving benefits.
Additionally, the Personal Responsibility Act creates many factual
problems relating to which qualifying quarters may be credited to a
minor. 8' Under the Personal Responsibility Act, a child could count
those quarters worked by a parent while the child was under the age
of eighteen.' 82 This can raise complex questions that would create a
great risk of administrative error regarding the identity of the legal
(1) You perform the work within the United States (whether or not you or
your employer are a citizen or resident of the United States). (2) You per-
form the work outside the United States and you are a citizen or resident of
the United States working for-(i) An American employer; or (ii) A foreign
affiliate of an American employer that has in effect an agreement covering
your work ....
ld.
179. In attempting to qualify for food stamp benefits, legal immigrants who were
paid off the books may become liable for harsh income tax penalties for failure to
report cash income on a federal tax return. I.R.C. § 6651 (CCH 1996). However, in
assuming that most legal immigrants applying for food stamp benefits fall below the
poverty line of $7763, see supra note 85-86, most legal immigrants would probably fall
below the $6550 taxable income threshold for single individuals and not have to pay
taxes. See I.R.C. Tax Rate Schedules vii (CCH 1996). If an individual owes no taxes,
there can be no accumulating penalty. However, in most cases, there is also an added
withholding tax problem. Generally, employers that pay a salary to legal immigrants
are required by the Internal Revenue Service to withhold a certain amount from pay-
ment and to place this money in a trust fund for the government. I.R.C. § 7501 (CCH
1996). The amount that the employer is required to withhold from the employee is,
for the most part, to satisfy the employee's tax liability. A smaller amount is required
to be withheld because of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act-FICA or social
security taxes. C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Construction, Application, and Effect, with
Respect to Withholding, Social Security, and Unemployment Compensation Taxes, of
Statutes Imposing Penalties for Tax Evasion or Default, 22 A.L.R.3d 8 § 2(a) (1968 &
Supp. 1996). The employer also is liable to the government for his share of FICA
taxes. Id. Because most legal immigrants have played by the rules and the employers
did not lawfully pay social security taxes, it makes little sense to now punish the legal
immigrant employee by denying them needed food stamp benefits. It would be more
logical to penalize the employer through various provisions in the tax code. For ex-
ample, under I.R.C. § 6672(a) (CCH 1996), when an employer that is under a duty to
collect withholding taxes willfully fails to perform this duty, the employer is liable for
a civil penalty equal to the amount of the tax not collected. Id.
180. See McDonnell, supra note 1, at B6.
181. See The Personal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 435, 110 Stat.
2105, 2275 (1996).
182. Id.
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immigrant's biological parents, the legal immigrant's parents' dates of
employment, and whether the legal immigrant's parents worked on or
off the books.s Moreover, if a parent will not cooperate or is un-
available to validate a child's claim, witnesses may be needed to deter-
mine eligibility.
Further, a legal immigrant can count all qualifying quarters worked
by a spouse during their marriage provided that the legal immigrant
remains married to his or her spouse or his or her spouse has died.1
This issue brings up many of the same factual questions discussed
above in the case of a legal immigrant's child;1as however, an addi-
tional question of proving the existence of a marriage is also
involved.18
To maintain food stamp benefits if the legal immigrant's recorded
date of entry into the country was less than ten years ago, the legal
immigrant has to produce the full name, date of birth, social security
number, and sex of each individual (self, parent, or spouse) whose
work history is relevant to the determination of eligibility, and a re-
lease form signed by each such individual giving the SSA permission
to release information on that individual to the state agency and the
legal immigrant.187 The requirement of a release form from relatives
will be perplexing for both state workers and legal immigrants. 11
Problems will arise if the relative refuses to sign a release form, has
died, or has moved out of the United States. Again, witnesses and
further evidence will be needed to establish the validity of a legal im-
migrant's forty qualifying quarter claim.
Without knowing the specifics of these key questions-whether the
legal immigrants were paid off the books, minor children's and
spouses' ability to prove the validity of their claims, and the difficulties
associated with the requirement of a release form-neither state
workers nor applicants can know whether a legal immigrant meets the
183. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1991) (holding that a state statute
authorizing prejudgment attachment on real estate without notice or hearing created
"too great a risk of erroneous deprivation under any of [its confusing] interpreta-
tions" and did not satisfy the requirements of procedural due process).
184. § 435, 110 Stat. at 2275.
185. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
186. For example, documents that would show a legal marriage may be overseas
and not accessible to any governmental agency.
187. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
188. See Judith Havemann & Barbara Vobejda, Advocacy Groups Across U.S. Pre-
paring to Challenge Welfare Law, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1996, at A8 (reporting that
legal immigrants may be wrongfully denied aid because of erroneous decisions made
by untrained state workers); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1991)
(stating that when an issue does not concern ordinary uncomplicated matters, the high
probability of error that results shows that fairness is rarely obtained through one-
sided determinations of facts).
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forty qualifying quarter exception and is eligible for food stamps
within the specified six month SSA review period.189
In addition, state food stamp agencies must communicate with the
INS to determine whether a person is in the country legally for forty
qualifying quarters. If the dates of legal immigrants' entry into the
country are inconsistent with having ten or more years of qualifying
work during the initial determination of a legal immigrant's forty
qualifying quarters claim, the legal immigrant loses his or her food
stamp benefits. 190 State food stamp agencies must also contact the
SSA to determine if the legal immigrant has worked forty qualifying
quarters. With many government agencies working together on nu-
merous, difficult factual questions, the probability of administrative
error is exceedingly high, especially in high immigration centers like
California, New York, Florida, and Texas. 191
If there is such a great deal of confusion regarding a statute's inter-
pretation, the risk of administrative error is too high to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process.1 92 Moreover, in food stamp cases, the risk
of erroneous deprivation has been considered extremely high.193
Courts have stated that when the risk of erroneous deprivation is sub-
stantial, the possibility of additional procedural safeguards must be
examined.194
189. See Graham v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1573, 1580 (N.D. W. Va. 1983) (holding
that when factual issues relate to a recipient's medical condition that must be deter-
mined by the Social Security Administration, disability benefits can only be termi-
nated when there is proof that the recipient's condition has improved). "[T]he public
interest... rests with preserving the financial status quo of the plaintiffs pending final
resolution of the primary issue raised." Id-
190. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
191. Virginia Ellis, Immigrant Food Stamp Ban Voided, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1996, at
A3 (reporting that a Sacramento Superior Court judge struck down a California di-
rective that denied food stamp benefits to legal immigrants because the "counties
were confused and unable to clearly determine who should be allowed to get food
stamps"); Havemann & Vobejda, supra note 188, at A8 (stating that during the imple-
mentation of the Personal Responsibility Act exempt legal immigrants will be mistak-
enly denied benefits by overworked state agency employees).
192. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13-14; see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
434-35 (1982) (holding that "[a] system or procedure that deprives persons of their
claims in a random manner... necessarily presents an unjustifiably high risk that
meritorious claims will be terminated").
193. Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that detailed ad-
vance notice of food stamp termination and reductions is required because of the
substantial risk of erroneous deprivation), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976); Bliek v.
Palmer, 916 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding that the risk of erroneous
deprivation is high in the food stamp context), affd, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997);
Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F. Supp. 749, 757 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that the calculation
of food stamp benefits requires an individualized determination of income, expenses,
and deductions for each recipient to prevent unjust decisions).
194. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13-14.
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3. The Government's Interest
For the government: 1) the costs of more detailed procedures; 2)
the administrative burden; and 3) the expense of providing food stamp
benefits to legal immigrants pending a pre-termination hearing are all
factors that must be considered in a procedural due process analy-
sis.19-5 While the governmental interest in conserving fiscal and admin-
istrative resources is an important factor, however, it "is not a
controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a par-
ticular procedural safeguard. '1 9%
First, the government cannot argue that pre-deprivation evidentiary
hearings for legal immigrants would create enormous administrative
costs when it claims to provide detailed post-deprivation hearings.19
Second, some courts have stated that the administrative burden in
welfare and food stamp cases is not an overriding interest.1 98 Third,
the government's concern with paying non-recoverable food stamp
benefits to legal immigrants is also a weak governmental interest. As
stated in Goldberg, the government itself can minimize these benefit
payments by developing accurate and efficient procedures through the
"skillful use of personnel and facilities."'' 9 Furthermore, other impor-
tant governmental interests, like the preservation of the dignity and
well-being of its people, are served by providing legal immigrants with
a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.200
4. The Balancing of the Mathews Factors
The prospect of serious harm resulting from the continuation of
benefits to legal immigrants until a full evidentiary hearing is minimal
195. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) (stating that the administra-
tive burden and other societal costs must be weighed in the procedural due process
analysis).
196. It. at 348.
197. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text for a description of the Social
Security Administration's hearing procedures; see also Doehr, 501 U.S. at 16 (noting
that the government cannot claim additional administrative and financial burdens for
pre-deprivation hearings when it provides similar post-deprivation hearings).
198. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970); Bliek v. Palmer, 916 F. Supp.
1475, 1490 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that the fiscal and administrative concerns of the
government in food stamp cases "must be viewed as negligible"), affd, 102 F.3d 1472(8th Cir. 1997).
199. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266; see Bliek, 916 F. Supp. at 1490 (dismissing the gov-
ernment's argument that their interest in paying non-recoverable food stamp benefits
is substantial).
200. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65 (stating that the United States' "basic com-
mitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its bor-
ders"); Bliek, 916 F. Supp. at 1492 (noting that food stamps help bring "the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community"); Mark R. Fondacaro, Toward a Synthesis of Law and Social Science:
Due Process and Procedural Justice in the Context of National Health Care Reform, 72
Deny. U. L. Rev. 303, 309 (1995) (arguing that the relationship between due process
and respect for human dignity is an important governmental interest).
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in comparison to the possible harm that legal immigrants face.2 °1
Even though the government would argue that any more detailed pro-
cedures and investigations would be cost inefficient, the magnitude of
harm to the legal immigrant is so great that legal immigrants could be
denied "the very means by which to live'"202 while waiting for a deter-
mination on the accuracy of the original decision that had terminated
their benefits.20 3 Congress designed the Food Stamp Program to pro-
mote the well-being of the population by raising nutritional standards
among low income households. 21 The Food Stamp Program's eco-
nomic efficiency should not be given greater weight than the subsis-
tence of legal immigrants who may rightfully qualify for food stamp
assistance.20
The adjudication of the legal immigrant's forty quarter claim by the
Social Security Administration within six months on the basis of docu-
ments submitted and conversations with the legal immigrant hardly
seems appropriate.20 6 Legal immigrants attempting to meet this ex-
ception will raise many difficult questions and issues that will take
201. See Bliek, 916 F. Supp. at 1490 (holding that although the government has an
interest in conserving financial resources, administrative inconvenience is not a con-
trolling factor); see also Tribe, supra note 27, § 10-13, at 541 (claiming that administra-
tive inconvenience has not traditionally been a public concern). Additionally, Tribe
states that the emphasis on minimizing governmental expense and limiting the indi-
vidual's process rights
represents a considerable break with a tradition that has identified the due
process clause as "designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citi-
zenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones."
ld. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
202. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (noting that an individual denied benefits necessary
for subsistence becomes "immediately desperate" and this "adversely affects his abil-
ity to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy").
203. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483-84 (1986) (stating that
claimants would be irreparably harmed if their disability benefits were discontinued
until redetermination of eligibility). The Court also noted that "[w]e should be espe-
cially sensitive to this kind of harm where the Government seeks to require claimants
to exhaust administrative remedies merely to enable them to receive the procedure
they should have been afforded in the first place." Id. at 484; see Connecticut v.
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (maintaining that in a deprivation of property case a
later hearing might fairly settle the dispute, "but this would not cure the temporary
deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented"); Fox v. Bowen, 656 F.
Supp. 1236, 1243-44 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding that recovery of retroactive benefits by
Medicare claimants would not fully compensate them for loss of original benefits).
204. See supra part II.B for a discussion of the Food Stamp Program's purpose.
205. See Ortiz v. Regan, 749 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that there
is no government interest that supports the complete elimination of monthly retire-
ment benefits); Graham v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1573, 1580 (N.D. W. Va. 1983) (find-
ing that the public interest would best be served by preserving the financial status quo
of Social Security recipients pending final resolution of the conflict because of the
Social Security Program's humanitarian aims).
206. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1464 (maintaining that immigrants pay taxes
and pay far more in total taxes than they receive in total benefits).
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more than six months to decide correctly. Because under the Ma-
thews balancing test 2°7 the great interest in food stamp benefits for
legal immigrants multiplied by the likelihood of reducing administra-
tive error2°8 through pre-termination evidentiary hearings is greater
than the cost of the pre-termination evidentiary hearings, full pre-ter-
uination evidentiary hearings are constitutionally mandated to pre-
serve the procedural due process rights of legal immigrants.1 9
C. Necessity of Pre-Termination Evidentiary Hearings
While the government has issued detailed procedures to deal with
legal immigrants' food stamp claims,2 10 full pre-termination eviden-
tiary hearings must be granted to legal immigrants who claim to have
met the forty quarters exception. 2 ' Personal, pre-termination eviden-
tiary hearings are necessary because they are "tailored, in light of the
decision to be made... to insure that [legal immigrants] are given a
meaningful opportunity to present their case. ' 12 These hearings
207. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see supra part LD (discuss-
ing the Mathews balancing factors).
208. See supra note 16 for the confusion surrounding the implementation of the
Personal Responsibility Act and supra part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the high
probability of administrative error.
209. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,266 (1970); Dan-
iels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); see Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (contending that the minimum requirements of due process
require many protections for an individual including possible pre-deprivation hear-
ings); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 162 (D.C. 1980) (claiming that any
process eliminating a property right requires detailed procedural due process); see
also Bernard Schwartz, Some Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 28 Tulsa LJ. 793,
800 (1993) (arguing that the cost efficient procedure is the one that deals effectively
with the appropriate number of cases and the amount at stake in each case). For legalimmigrants with forty qualifying quarter claims, a full evidentiary hearing provides
the best alternative considering the magnitude of legal immigrants' personal interests
and the high probability of administrative error without pre-deprivation evidentiary
hearings.
210. See supra part III.B.
211. From a law and economics perspective, the use of proper procedure for legal
immigrants would strengthen the substantive aspects of the democratic process. The
Coase Theorem states that if high transaction costs exist for certain groups to partici-
pate in the bargaining process, which is usually the case for groups that are not politi-
cally active, the efficient outcome in the legislative process may not occur. A. Mitchell
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 13 (1989); Pritchard, supra note 29,
at 1065. For example, legal immigrants in need of food stamps face significant obsta-
cles to legislative bargaining and lobbying including low levels of education, geo-
graphical dispersement, and the inability to vote. It at 1085. In these situations, the
preferred legal process would be the one that minimizes the effects of transaction
costs. Polinsky, supra, at 13. Because a specially designated administrative judge will
be familiar with the nuances of food stamp procedures, a full pre-termination eviden-
tiary hearing would best be able to minimize transaction costs for parties that are
adversely affected and thus unable to actively participate in the substantive, political
process. This would provide an economic justification for the preservation of proce-
dural due process through a full pre-termination evidentiary hearing that maximizes
the total value of the democratic process. See Pritchard, supra note 29, at 1065-66.
212. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (citation omitted).
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would eliminate misunderstandings in the interpretation of vague pro-
visions of the Personal Responsibility Act and focus the issues in dis-
pute. 13 The use of full evidentiary hearings would also create an
institutional restraint on arbitrary and unauthorized action by any of
the numerous administrative agencies involved in the food stamp
recertification process. 214 Additionally, formality in the food stamp
process would protect legal immigrants from race or class
prejudices.z 5
Minimal requirements of the full evidentiary hearing should in-
clude: 1) timely written notice of the legal immigrant's ineligibility
under the forty quarters exception;216 2) an opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence relating to
his employment history;217 3) a neutral administrative officer to deter-
213. Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 162 (showing that ambiguities can be disclosed and
clarified through hearings between the individual and decision-maker); Mattern v.
Mathews, 582 F.2d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 1978) (asserting that when an administrative
agency's determination is based on credibility, hearings are "crucial to the truth-find-
ing process"), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979).
214. See supra note 117 (discussing the weaknesses of the interview recertification
process); see also Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 162 (claiming that government workers
would be dissuaded from using arbitrary actions to deny an individual benefits if they
were required to provide an oral hearing); Small v. Sullivan, 820 F. Supp. 1098, 1107(S.D. Ill. 1992) (maintaining that prejudice and hostility on the part of a hearing of-
ficer violate procedural due process).
215. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment, along with providing explicit equal protection guarantees, man-
dates that states give legal immigrants the same process as citizens when filing for
government benefits). Because classifications based on alienage are definitively sus-
pect and subject to strict scrutiny under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
guarantees, legal immigrants who are specifically excluded from government spon-
sored benefit programs, like food stamps, may have both a procedural due process
claim, for denial of existing benefits, and an equal protection claim, for exclusion of
legal immigrants from receiving government funds. Id. at 371-72. The Constitution's
text, including the Bill of Rights, does not differentiate between citizens and legal
immigrants. U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV. But see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67(1976) (stating that the conditioning of aid on citizenship is firmly based in the law).
Furthermore, the Court in Diaz, while explicitly supporting Graham, and allowing
legal immigrants the right to procedural due process, also held that this does not af-
ford all aliens the same benefits of citizenship. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78; see Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625, 1690 (1992) (claiming that
while Graham v. Richardson is good law, it may be the "high water" mark for case law
relating to state alienage classifications).
216. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (requiring that recipients
have timely and accurate notice detailing the reasons for their proposed termination);
Bliek v. Palmer, 916 F. Supp. 1475, 1490-91 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (noting that, at aminimum, recipients must received detailed notice of changes in food stamp pay-
ments), aff'd, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997); Ortiz v. Regan, 749 F. Supp. 1254, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that detailed advance notice is needed to terminate retire-
ment benefits).
217. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 265 (1987) (stating that
allowing written and oral response to charges, including affidavits and supporting doc-
uments are aspects of procedural due process); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268 (allowing
benefit recipients an opportunity to defend by presenting arguments and evidence
1997] PRESERVING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
mine the outcome on the facts of the case de novo;21 8 and 4) if food
stamps are revoked, a written statement by administrative officer as to
evidence relied on during the decision-making process.219
CONCLUSION
Laws that restrict eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits conflict
with traditional governmental policy. One of the distinctive commit-
ments of United States immigration policy has been to encourage im-
migrants to assimilate into society. Yet, the Personal Responsibility
Act erodes that commitment, causing "[l]egal immigrants who have
played by the rules... and have every reason to assume that they are
welcome here, [to] be stripped of their federal benefits [without pro-
cedural due process]." 0
The principal reason for having procedural due process safeguards
is to prevent inaccurate or unjust decisions. This is especially true for
a group such as legal immigrants. The Due Process Clause mandates
that procedures meet constitutional guarantees. By protecting legalimmigrants' procedural due process rights and having them more fully
participate in the democratic process, the nation's democracy will be
enriched. Without procedural due process protection, however,
"[m]any [legal immigrants] have no idea what is about to happen to
them," 1 and they will suffer irreparable harm. The ramifications of
having no procedural safeguard requirements in legislative proceed-
ings when legal immigrants make claims under the forty qualifying
orally); Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that
Medicaid enrollees receive a pre-deprivation hearing before termination of benefits);
Fondacaro, supra note 200, at 310 (claiming that for an indigent person an oral hear-
ing would result in fairer and more accurate decisions). Moreover, the right to con-
front and cross examine adverse witnesses would also be valuable for legal
immigrants. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,215 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that the right of confrontation tests the truth of accusations); Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 268, 270 (requiring recipients be given an effective opportunity to confront
and cross examine any adverse witnesses).
218. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (1970) (mandating that the officer's conclusion
rest only on the evidence and legal rules presented at the hearing); Daniels, 926 F.
Supp. at 1312-13 (following Goldberg's mandate that to meet procedural due process
guarantees an appeal must be heard by an impartial adjudicator); Cain v. Virginia, 574
F. Supp. 559, 562 (W.D. Va. 1983) (noting that due process is violated if an adminis-
trative officer has a bias before a case hearing); see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456
U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (stating that due process requires impartiality on the part of
hearing officers).
219. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (suggesting that the decision maker state the
reasons for his ruling and indicate the evidence on which he relied); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (holding that the minimum requirements of due
process include a written statement by the decision-maker as to the evidence and
rationale relied upon); Tribe, supra note 27, § 10-7, at 503 (stating that an explanation
as to why a decision was made provides the affected individual with a valuable intrin-
sic sense of participation in the hearing process).
220. 142 Cong. Rec. E1570 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
221. 142 Cong. Rec. S11,868 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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quarters exception are exacerbated by the possible results of the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act's food stamp provisions. The prospect of
having people left hungry without any procedural due process safe-
guards is not enticing.
While substance and procedure work together, the use of full evi-
dentiary hearings for legal immigrants attempting to meet the forty
qualifying quarters exception will only properly enforce, not nullify,
the Personal Responsibility Act. The mandate established in
Goldberg v. Kelly dictates that due process requires the granting of a
full evidentiary hearing before termination of food stamp benefits for
those legal immigrants attempting to meet the forty qualifying
quarters exception. Thus, to affect a legal immigrant's property inter-
est in food stamp benefits under the statutory forty quarters excep-
tion, the full procedural safeguards imposed in court proceedings
should be required, including the right to call witnesses, the right to
counsel, and the right to cross examine.
